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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the properties of states of consciousness as they are revealed by the process of state-change or switching. 
Drawing on examples of state of consciousness transitions in infants, altered states of consciousness, and psychiatric disorders, a 
number of common principles are derived. These include the observation that states of consciousness are discrete self-organizing 
patterns of behavior differing along axes of affect, access to memory, attention and cognition, regulatory physiology, and sense of 
self. State transitions are marked by non-linear changes in these variables. A developmental model is outlined and the implications 
for treatment and further research are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a model of multiple personality 
disorder and other psychiatric disorders that are concep-
tualized for the purposes of this paper as "state-change" 
disorders. We will first discuss the concept of states of 
consciousness, focusing on the properties of states that 
are relevant to state-change psychopathology. Next we 
will explore the phenomenology and physiology of the 
state-change or switch process. Finally we will discuss 
implications of the model for clinical interventions and 
further research. 
STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
Definitions: 
The concept of state, mental state or state of con-
. sciousness, originally derived from the Latin status, 
. : meaning condition of being, has a long and complex 
history beyond the scope of this paper. The concept of 
. states of consciousness came into its present usage by 
" the end of the eighteenth century, was central to the 
early descriptions of hypnotic phenomena, and remains 
a privotal idea in modem psychology. Today the term is 
widely used in the psychological and psychiatric litera-
ture and represents an unquestioned assumption in 
many clinical formulations and psychological theories. 
The supposition of a dichotomy between state and trait 
properties is, for example, central to much of the current 
research in biological psychiatry. 
While there is no single definition of state that 
covers the range of clinical uses, the one proposed by 
Emde et a1. (1976), drawing on earlier work by Prechtl 
and his colleagues (Prechtl et aI., 1968), is a good place to 
begin. They define state as: "A constellation of certain 
patterns of physiological variables and/ or patterns of 
behaviors which seem to repeat themselves and which 
appear to be relatively stable (p. 29)." Wolff (1987) also 
citing Prechtl's contributions, further adds that states are 
"ensembles of self-organizing variables" and notes that 
"state transitions [switches] are discontinuous relation-
ships among ensembles of state variables rather than 
linear changes along a quantitative continuum of levels 
of arousal or excitation (p. 19)." 
PROPERTIES OF STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
There is a large and diverse literature on states of 
consciousness including: 1) work on a variety of patho-
logical states of consciousness such as affective, anxiety, 
psychotic, catatonic, and dissociative states; 2) sleep/ 
wake alterations in state of consciousness; 3) hypnotic 
and meditational states of consciousness; 4) drug-
induced states of consciousness; 5) psychoanalytic work 
on ego states; and 6) states of consciousness during 
infancy. A number of central properties of states emerge 
from a review of this literature. The first is the idea that 
states are discrete and discontinuous. Tart (197J) and 
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others have, in fact, argued that it is more precise to 
speak of a "discrete state of consciousness" rather than 
the more commonly used "state of consciousness." The 
discontinuous nature of states of consciousness is best 
demonstrated by the work on infant consciousness 
(Wolff, 1987), bipolar disorders (Bunney et al., 1977), 
and state-dependent psychophysiology (Lydic, 1987). 
A second general property of states of conscious-
ness is that they are self-organizing and self-stabilizing 
structures of behavior. When a transition (switch) from 
one state of consciousness to another state of conscious-
ness occurs, the new state acts to impose a quanitatively 
and qualitatively different structure on the variables that 
define the state of consciousness. The new structure acts 
to reorganize behavior and resist changes to other states. 
A good illustration of this property comes from the 
work on infant states of consciousness. Wolff (1987) has 
shown, for example, that transitions from waking to 
sleep state I in infants (infant sleep is classified by 
"states" rather than the "stages" used in adults) follow a 
predictable sequence and that entry into sleep state I 
results in a rapid reorganization of a number of state 
variables. Once the infant has stabilized in sleep state I, 
it is resistant to destabilization caused by attempts to 
wake the infant. A nudge, tickle, or loud noise may 
briefly disorganize the sleep state and wake the infant, 
who rapidly reorganizes back into sleep state I. The 
stability of a given state and its resistance to disorganiza-
tion vary from state to state, e.g., infant sleep state I is 
more resistant to experimental disruptions than infant 
sleep state II (Wolff, 1987). Resistance to destabilization 
declines over time in a given state; e.g., sleep state I is 
more resistant to destablization early on than after it has 
been present for 20 minutes. 
A third general principle is that switches between 
states are manifest by non-linear changes in a number of 
variables (Wolff, 1987). These variables include: 1) 
affect; 2) access to memory, i.e. state-dependent mem-
ory; 3) attention and cognition; 4) regulatory physiology; 
and 5) sense of self. For reasons discussed below, 
changes of state are difficult to discern in normal adults. 
Changes in affect and mood are, however, probably the 
single best marker of state switches in normal adults. 
The most important marker of state-dependency of 
learning and memory in normal adults is mood. 
(Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; Weingartner et al., 1977). 
State dependent access to memory and state dependent 
learning, while most robustly demonstrated with drug-
induced manipulations of state (Overton, 1984), can be 
observed in a variety of psychiatric and neurologic state-
Change disorders (Eich, 1986; Weingartner, 1978; Silber-
Inan et al., 1985; Nissen et al., in press), with hypnotic 
manipulatiOns of state (Blaney, 1986), and with mood 
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manipulations of state (Bower, 1981). Attention and 
cognition vary with state. Examples range from the 
extreme shifts seen across sleeping vs. waking states to 
the more subtle manifestations seen in state-dependent 
learning studies and found in state-change disorders 
such as bipolar illness (Reus et al., 1979). 
There is an extensive experimental literature on 
state-dependent or state-specific physiology (Lydic, 
1987). It is likely that state-specific physiOlogy has been 
an unrecognized contaminant in the current search for 
biological traits that differentiate specific psychiatric 
disorders. State-dependent differences in sense of self, 
e.g., self-esteem and body image, are commonly noted in 
clinical alterations of state (Horowitz & Zilberg, 1983; 
Putnam, in press). As an illustration, one need only 
recall the dramatic transformation of sense of self from 
worthless to grandiose that accompanies switches from 
depressive to manic states in bipolar patients. 
DEVELOPMENT OF STATES 
States appear to be the fundamental unit of organi-
zation of consciousness and are detectable from the first 
moments following birth. Wolff (1966, 1978) and others 
have used a standard taxonomy of states to describe 
neonatal behavior up to about age 1 year. As Emde et a1. 
(1977) observe, "the amount of scientific literature 
dealing with state-related variables drops off precip-
itiously after the newborn period (p. 30)." This is due in 
large part to the fact that behavioral states become 
increasingly difficult to differentiate with maturation 
and are less likely to show obvious physiological 
correlates. Reseachers therefore discuss differences in 
subjects' readiness to respond in terms such as: attitudes, 
set, cognitive style and psychological structures (Emde 
et al., 1977). A few investigators, such as Horowitz 
(1979), however, continue to focus on states as clinically 
important determinants of cognition and behavior. 
In part, the increasing difficulty in specifying state 
is probably a reflection of a normal developmental 
process that smoothes out the transitions across states of 
consciousness in normal individuals. We speak of this 
developmental task in infants as their learning to 
achieve homeostasis, i.e., the ability of infants/children 
to modulate state so that they are in a context-appropri-
ate state and the capacity to recover from disruptions of 
state. This developmental task is Significantly influ-
enced by input from caretakers who help the infant! 
child achieve appropriate state transitions, e.g., waking 
up and alerting at feeding time and relaxing at nap time. 
Nowhere is caretaker-facilitated state change more 
apparent than with premature infants, who require 
extensive modulating input from caretakers before they 
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can achieve a state of alertness and motor organization 
necessary for successful feeding. With experience and 
maturation of the nervous system, the infant/child 
becomes increasingly able to self-regulate state. This 
developmental task represents another arena in which 
aberrant caretaker behavior may playa role in the 
dysregulation of state seen in psychiatric conditions 
such as MPD. 
A second reason that discrete states of conscious-
ness become more difficult to discriminate as children 
grow older is that there are an increasing number of 
states, differentiated by more subtle changes in state 
variables. Neonatal researchers agree on a constellation 
of five to seven discrete states shown by normal infants. 
By age one year, a child may well have added dozens of 
states. By adulthood that child may have hundreds of 
discrete states and be able to make transitions among 
them almost seamlessly. It is only in certain disorders in 
which there are pathological states ( e.g., depression. 
anxiety, catatonia, and/ or the individual becomes 
"stuck" in a state or conversely cannot hold an appropri-
ate state) that the role of states of consciousness in the 
patterning and organization of behavior can again be 
appreciated. 
Certain psychiatriC disorders can be conceptualized 
as "state-change" disorders, in that a major pathophysi-
ological component of the disorder comes from a 
dysregulation of the state transition process. Depression 
can be used as an example. Everyone becomes de-
pressed periodically, but typically cycles out of the 
depressed state spontaneously or with a little deliberate 
self-induced state manipulation, e.g., a shopping spree 
makes some individuals feel better. Depression only 
becomes a clinical condition when the person becomes 
"stuck" in the depressed state for a specified length of 
time, e.g~, a minimum of two weeks by DSM-III-R 
criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). It is 
the failure to switch out of this universally experienced 
state that defines it as a pathological condition. Other 
. . disorders, e.g., panic attacks are characterized by 
precipitous shifts in state from normal states to patho-
logical states without obvious cause. In some cases. such 
as "specific" phobic disorders or posttraumatic flash-
backs, the precipitous shift in state of consciousness is 
triggered by an environmental stimulus. 
MULTIPLE PERSONALIlY DISORDER AS A 
STATE-CHANGE DISORDER 
s ~ Multiple personality can be thought of as a disorder 
: in which the individual's consciousness is organized 
~ into a series of discrete dissociative stat~s (alter person-
) ali ties) centered around specific affects, body images, 
?I 
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modes of cognition and perception, state-dependent 
memories, and behaviors. By and large the transitions 
between these rarified states are abrupt and discontinu-
ous compared to the smoother transitions between 
normal states of consciousness. These highly segregated 
dissociative states are developed during childhood in 
the context of severe trauma, generally repetitive child 
abuse (Bliss, 1980: 1986: Putnam et al., 1986). 
At least two processes probably converge to 
enhance the distinctiveness and separation of these alter 
personality states. First, the data suggest that the 
trauma must occur relatively early in development and 
almost always before puberty (Bliss, 1980: Greaves, 1980; 
Putnam et al., 1986). This suggests that the trauma may 
be interrupting the normal developmental process of 
smoothing out transitions between states, thereby 
leaving the individual with abrupt state transitions that 
resemble those of infants and small children. 
Secondly, it is thought that it is adaptive for the 
traumatized child to enter into dissociative states of 
consciousness which appear to heighten the state-
dependentness of variables such as affect, memory 
retrieval, and behavior (Braun & Sachs, 1985; KIuft, 
1984). By binding these variables to discrete, circum-
scribed dissociative states, the child protects him or 
herself against being overwhelmed by a flood of painful 
affects and memories during times when he is not being 
traumatized. This enables the child to successfully 
function in other areas of his life. Over time, and in a 
way that is as yet not understood, the repeated entry 
into these heightened dissociative states of conscious-
ness builds up alter personalities with an elaborated 
sense of self, who personify specific affects, behaviors 
and developmental ages and who often become invested 
in their own separateness and in conflict with other alter 
personality states. 
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE 
SWITCH PROCESS 
For our purposes, we will define a state-change or 
switch as the psychobiological events associated with 
shifts in state of consciousness as manifest by changes in 
state-related variables such affect, access to memories, 
sense of self, cognitve and perceptual style, and often 
reflected in alterations in facial expression, speech and 
motor activity, and interpersonal relatedness. In work-
ing with non-multiple patients, Mardi Horowitz (1979) 
has observed that state changes are " ... commonly 
recognized during a clinical interview because of 
changes in facial expression, intonation and inflection of 
speech, focus and content of verbal reports, in degree 
and nature of empathy, and other communicative 
qualities." (p. 31) 
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SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF 
THE SWITCH PROCESS 
One might expect that there would be a large 
introspective literature on switching. What does it feel 
like to switch? Yet very little has peen written. Research-
ers of altered states of consciousness in particular, have 
tried to study the subjective state-change experience 
with little success. Zinberg (1977) described a Zen sect 
that attempted to introspectively observe the exact 
moment of transition between waking and sleep without 
success. Tart (1977) tried to study the moment of getting 
"high" on marijunia, with equally poor results. The vast 
majority of users only became aware of ''being stoned" 
sometime after they felt that they had become stoned. 
Gil and Brenman (1959) found the same problem with 
hypnotic state transitions. Deikman (1977) has labeled 
this phenomenon the problem of the missing center. It is 
as if the "self' that observes and remembers is state-
dependence and is suspended during the moment of 
transition between states of consciousness. Studies of 
memory performance during alcohol-induced changes 
in state, indicate that impairment of memory is most 
sensitive to the rate of change rather than the absolute 
blood level of alcohol (Jones, 1973). Taken together, 
these subjective and experimental observations suggest 
during periods of rapid transition between states, indi-
viduals do not observe, learn, or store information well. 
SWITCH SPEED 
How rapidly do switches occur? Several factors 
influence the precision with which we can determine the 
rate of a state transition. The first is the sampling rate of 
the measurement device. The ability to determine the 
rate of change is a function of how often one tests for a 
change. For example, the same behavioral rating scale 
will yield different results if it is applied every five 
minutes or every eight hours. The second limitation is 
identification of clear endpoints that signify a state 
change has been completed. For example, if one re-
quires a certain amount of change in a nurse admini-
stered rating scale, e.g., four points over a previous 
baseline, it may take several hours to days before the 
subject behaviorally manifests this degree of change in 
the presence of the nursing staff. lf one is testing for a 
significant change in motor activity, speech or facial 
expression, a switch may become apparent within min-
utes to hours. The obvious problem is that with so many 
levels of temporal resolution across different measures it 
is difficult to cross-validate any given measure. 
-
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FIGUREl 
Figure I shows the mean duration of switching for 
nine MPD patients measured across six or more alter 
personality changes. In this case, the behavioral end-
points for determining that a new stable state, i.e., an 
alter personality, had emerged was based on continuous 
observation and verbal interaction with the subject until 
it was established from the individual's facial expres-
sion, behavior and verbal report that a new alter person-
ality was present and stabilized. This data is in agree-
ment with reports by the vast majority of therapists that 
alter personality switches typically occur within five 
minutes (Putnam et al., 1986). Similar observational data 
have been collected on state transitions in infants, 
yielding switch times of the same magnitude (Wolff, 
1987). Drug-induced flashbacks and panic attacks 
likewise have onset/offset times of the same order of 
magnitude (Rainey et al., 1987). 
If one studies videotapes of alter personality 
switches in MPD patients using facial changes as end-
point markers, some switches appear to occur within a 
few seconds. Similar results have been noted in bipolar 
patients undergOing sleep-deprivation induced switches 
into mania and then back into depression (Rubinow -
unpublished data). Switch speed data on bipolar 
patients from studies conducted during the mid-1970's 
using nursing ratings administered every eight hours 
suggest a greater variability of switch speed, ranging 
from five minutes to several days to complete the 
transition between retarded depression and mania 
(Bunney & Murphy, 1974; Bunney et al., 1977). The 
majority of these switches were completed within an 
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hour, however, and a review of the nursing notes on 
these patients (Bunney et al., 1972), reveals comments 
describing these switches as "rapid, sudden, striking, 
marked change" implying a much faster process than 
reflected by the infrequent behavioral ratings. 
Triggers for Switching 
Switches can be triggered by a wide range of 
stimuli. Cognitive stimuli, such as depressive trains of 
thought (Seligman, 1975; Beck, 1976), a~ve~saIY. 
reactions (Hilgard & Newman, 1969), SOCIal SItuations or 
expectations may lead to state changes. Self-induced 
volitional state changes probably occur in most indi-
viduals. Bunney et al. (1972) found that discussions of 
passes or discharge planning often appeared to trigger 
switches into mania. Sensory stimuli are powerful 
triggers of state change, particularly for ev~king .di~­
ciative or anxiety states. Researchers studymg dISSOCIa-
tive and anxiety reactions in posttraumatic stress disor-
der make use of auditory and/or visual stimuli that are 
similar to combat sights and sounds to evoke abreac- . 
tions and anxiety reactions (Dobbs & Wilson, 1960; Kolb, 
1987), though cognitive imagery techniques can be. 
equally effective (Pitman et al., 1987). Olfactory (Khne & 
Rausch, 1985) and tactile stimuli can likewise be power-
ful cues for triggering a switch into a dissocative or 
anxiety state. 
Forced motor activity in depressed adults (Post & 
Goodwin, 1973) and postural changes in infants (Wolff, 
1987) appear to induce changes in state of consciousness. 
Young children appear to make use of postural and 
motor changes, such as twirling and hanging upside 
down, to alter their state of consciousness (Weil, 1972). 
Drugs and alcohol are well-documented triggers for 
state changes, even when actual blood levels are very 
low, suggesting a cueing effect. In cocaine and opiate 
addictions, drug-craving or drug-withdrawal states can 
be produced in abstinent abusers idiosyn~ratic environ-
mental cues linked to past drug use (Gawm & Kleber, 
1986). Pain, fatigue, and sleep deprivation (Wehr et al., 
1987) are common "physiological" state change triggers. 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE SWITCH PROCESS 
IN MPD PATIENTS 
During our studies of hundreds of alter personality 
state switches in MPD patients using various combina-
tions of slow motion videotapes, EEG, and autonomic 
physiological measures, a number of common features 
have emerged. The first is that the majo~ty of alt.er . 
personality switches occur relatively rapIdly, ~Ically m 
under five minutes, though deternunation of SWItch 
speed is subject to all of the methodologicallimit~tions 
discussed above. Secondly, most~ but not all, patients 
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exhibit either a burst of rapid blinking or one or more 
upward eye rolls at the beginning of the switch. This 
may be followed by a transient "blank:' or vacant g~ze. 
Thirdly, there is a disturbance of ongomg autononuc 
regulatory rhythms, particular~y heart rate a~d respira-
tion, together with a burst of dIffuse motor dIscharge. 
On videotape, one can see a rearraI'lgement of facial 
musculature that coincides with the motor discharge. 
The facial rearrangement often occurs in a stepwise 
fashion as a series of grimaces. As the new alter person-
ality state stabilizes, there are often postural shifts. 
The newly emerged alter personality state differs 
from the preceding one along a number of dimensions. 
Typically there is a shift in affect. Voice and speech 
differences, long noted by clinicians working with MPD 
(e.g., Cory, 1919: Goddard, 1936; Mason, 1893; Peck, 
1922; Prince, 1917), are common and are not merely sec-
ondary to changes in pitch but also involve shifts in 
format frequency (Ludlow & Putnam, unpublished data) 
as well as rate and volume. Baseline motor activity and 
muscle tension are usually altered. Perceptual and 
cognitive changes may be manifest by the newly 
emerged alter personality state's responses to the 
environment. Not infrequently, the current alter person-
ality state will take great pains to differentiate itself from 
the preceding state, reflecting a significant shift in the 
person's sense-of-self. 
While all of these changes are clinically striking, 
similar changes have long been reported with state-
changes in other psychiatric disorders. For example, 
switches between depression and mania in bipolar 
affective patients are characterized by a dramatic shift in 
affect, together with changes in rate and volume of 
speech (Bunney et al., 1972), motor activity (Wolff et al., 
1985), and cognitive function (Bunney et al., 1972). And 
of, course, there is a significant shift in sense-of-self from 
the worthless and hopelessness of depression to the 
grandiosity of full-blown mania. Periodic catatonia 
likewise is characterized by precipitous shifts in affect, 
speech, motor activity, and state-specific physiology 
(Gjessing, 1974). 
ORDER EFFECTS 
Clinical observation and research on state-changes 
in psychiatric disorders suggests thilt there are a number 
of order effects. The first is a directional or pathway 
effect. i.e., that transitions from state A to state B may 
follow a different pathway than transitions from state B 
to state A. This is apparent in bipolar illness where 
switches from depression to mania typically pass 
through a transient intervening euthymic state while 
switches from mania into depression progress through 
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an "unstable period" characterized by rapid alternation 
between the symptoms of depression and mania until 
the individual finally stabilizes in a state of retarded 
depression (Bunney et al., 1972). 
In working with MPD patients we have observed 
that access to a specific alter personality state may 
require traversing an idiosyncratic pathway passing 
through an ordered succession of intervening alter 
personality states; e.g., alter A may only be accessible 
through Alter D which is only accessible through alter C 
so that one may have to pass from C to D to reach alter 
A. These observations suggest the existence of an 
underlying hierarchical organization of states ~r a ~t of 
different switch pathways dependent on the duectIon of 
the switch. Wolff (1987) endorses the latter position 
noting from his work on infant sleep/wake transitions 
that " ... the presumed neurological processes which 
effect a transition for waking to sleep may thus differ 
quaUtatively from mechanisms required for the transi-
tion from sleep to waking" (p. 54). 
A second type of order effect appears to be that 
certain alter personality states are likely to be preceded 
or followed by specific other alter personality states. 
While this apparent increased probability of one alter 
personality state, following another currently remains a 
clinical observation, the experiential sampling methodol-
ogy used by Lowenstei~ and his coll~a~es ~198!) to 
study a single MPD patIent's naturahstic SWItching 
pattern can be applied to the que~tion of alt~r ~sonal­
ity state sequences in MPD. The mcreased hkehhood of 
Specific state sequences occurring in relation to feeding 
has, however, been well documented by Wolff (1987) 
and others in infants. 
Based on preliminary results from our study of . 
Switching in MPD patients, it appears as if ~~ ord.er m 
which one studies a group of alter personahties WIll 
affect the psychophysiology of any ~ven alter ~rsonal­
ity state. It is as each alter personahty state, while 
tending towards a state-specific baseline on a given 
measure, e.g., heart rate, is also influenced to some 
extent by the characteristics of the alter personality states 
that preceded it. For example, alter A may show heart 
rate acceleration when preceded by alter B and decelera-
tion when preceded by alter C. This order effect appears 
to extend retrogradely through several preceding 
personality states, though the number of permutations 
rapidly makes this a difficult issue to study. 
MIXED STATES 
The issue of mixed states is one that is going to 
have to be addressed if we are to understand the interac-
tional role of states in normal and psychopathological 
-
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processes. Clinicians have reported the existence of 
mixed or "co-conscious" alter personality states in MPD 
patients since the earliest cases (e.g., Prince, 1917), and 
this phenomena continues to be important therapeuti-
cally (Braun, 1987) and experimentally (Loewenstein et 
al., 1987). Phenomenologically, mixed states appear to 
be present at times in bipolar mood disorders, and are 
dramatically manifest by the duality of consciousness 
seen with hynotically-induced conditions such the 
"hidden observer" phenomenon and in some age-
regressed individuals (Hilgard, 1986). Mixed states may 
also contribute to such "passive influence" symptoms as 
"made impulses", thought insertion, and thought with-
drawn commonly noted in MPD patients (Kluft, 1987). 
IMPLICATIONS OF A STATE-CHANGE 
MODEL OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
TREATMENT 
This model would predict that there are three levels 
of psychopathology involved in state-cha~ge di~rd~rs. 
The first is at the level of the states per se, I.e.,the IndI-
vidual enters into a state of consciousness, for example 
anxiety, that is dysfunctional and/or dysphoric. The 
second level is a disturbance in the switch mechanism, 
which may malfunction in a number of ways. It may 
become "stuck" so that the individual does not normally 
cycle out of a commonly experienced dysphoric state .. It 
may exhibit a '1ability" so the individual can not stabIl-
ize in a state such as occurs with rapid switching in 
multiple personality disorder (Kluft, 1983; Putnam et al., 
1984); or it may be highly susceptible to activation by 
environmental triggers lead,ing to stimulus-induced 
activation of states, e.g. flashbacks. The third level of 
psychopathology arises from the individual's responses 
to the first two levels. For example, the person may 
attempt to modulate state by using drugs or alcohol. 
Loss of control over state modulation may lead to secon-
dary depressions (Himmelhoch, 19~7), generali~ 
anxiety, or phobic avoidance of enVIronmental triggers. 
Therapeutic interventions based on this model 
would have to take into account the level(s) of psycho-
pathology. For example, treatment of substance abuse 
that is an attempt at self-modulation of state would be 
expected to have a poor outcome ~nless the prima~ 
problem with modulation of state IS addressed. It IS well 
known that the treatment of secondary symptoms, such 
as depression and anxiety commonly seen in multiple 
personality, have little impact on the patient's psychopa-
thology (Putnam et at, 1984). Conversely, when t?e 
dissociative alter personality states are worked WIth 
directly in therapy, many of the secondary affective, 
anxiety, and somatic symptoms disappear (Braun, 1987). 
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This model suggests several levels of therapeutic 
intervention in state-change disorders. The first is that 
of changing state. This may be accomplished in a 
variety of ways. Medications, for example antidepres-
sants and anxiolytics, may act by changing state biologi-
cally. Psychotherapy may work by enabling the patient 
to cognitively change his or her state of consciousness. 
Chronobiologic manipulations such as sleep deprivation 
may alter state by interfering with circadian state 
sequences (Campbell & Gillin, 1987). Interestingly, 
many of the above therapeutic interventions can, in 
susceptible individuals, induce rapid perturbations of 
state such as the rapid cycling in bipolar patients 
(Campbell & Gillin, 1987; Wehr & Goodwin, 1987). 
There is also evidence of cross-reactivity between state-
change modalities, e.g., certain antidepressant medica-
tions interfere with circadian rhythms (Zetin et aI., 1987). 
It is apparent that merely changing state is usually 
not enough; one must stabilize the individual in more 
functional states and prevent reentry into dysfunctional 
states. Some medications, particularly lithium, may act 
by stabilizing state (Wehr & Goodwin, 1987). Psycho-
therapy may help patients stabilize or modulate their 
state by enabling them to identify state-change triggers 
(e.g., depressive trains of thoughts, anniversary reac-
tions, etc., and provide them with alternative outcomes 
for these triggers. Psychotherapy may also act to disrupt 
the discreteness of some types of states, e.g,dissociative 
states, by bring emotionally charged state-dependent 
material into non-dissociative states of consciousness to 
be worked through and integrated. Behavioral desensi-
tization techniques, often used with phobic-stimulus 
induced panic disorders, may provide a quasi-state 
stabilization effect by reducing vulnerability to environ-
mentally triggered state-change, e.g., phobic object-
induced panic attacks. 
RESEARCH 
The states of consciousness/state-change model of 
provides a unique isomorphic concept that cuts across 
the many domains of psychiatric knowledge. Conceiva-
bly the specification of a state of consciousness can span 
the current chasm from the receptor level to the "ego." 
It is also a model well-rooted in the new discoveries of 
developmental psychology with its recent emphasis on 
the integration of "self" (Stem, 1985). Multiple person-
ality disorder provides a unique example of a traumati-
cally-induced state-change disorder with a profound 
disturbance in sense-of-self. 
Studies of the psychology and biology of the alter 
personality states permits us a powerful look at the 
variables that define states of consciousness and at the 
psychophysiological processes by which states of 
consciousnesses are created, maintained and exchanged. 
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